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Abstract
Chimpanzees routinely follow the gaze of humans to outside targets. However, in most studies using object choice they fail
to use communicative gestures (e.g. pointing) to find hidden food. Chimpanzees’ failure to do this may be due to several
difficulties with this paradigm. They may, for example, misinterpret the gesture as referring to the opaque cup instead of the
hidden food. Or perhaps they do not understand informative communicative intentions. In contrast, dogs seem to be skilful
in using human communicative cues in the context of finding food, but as of yet there is not much data showing whether
they also use pointing in the context of finding non-food objects. Here we directly compare chimpanzees’ (N=20) and
dogs’ (N=32) skills in using a communicative gesture directed at a visible object out of reach of the human but within reach
of the subject. Pairs of objects were placed in view of and behind the subjects. The task was to retrieve the object the
experimenter wanted. To indicate which one she desired, the experimenter pointed imperatively to it and directly rewarded
the subject for handing over the correct one. While dogs performed well on this task, chimpanzees failed to identify the
referent. Implications for great apes’ and dogs’ understanding of human communicative intentions are discussed.
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Introduction
Much recent research has found that chimpanzees understand
the goals and even intentions of others [1]. However, many studies
have also found that chimpanzees have difficulties using a human’s
referential gesture (e.g. pointing) to locate hidden food [2]. Of
course, if given enough trials, chimpanzees can learn to use the
pointing gesture, and they find it easier to learn this when the
pointing finger is close to the target location, i.e. within 5 cm –
perhaps due to local enhancement [3]. Chimpanzees raised by
humans may be better able to learn human gestures as well [4–6].
The problem is not that chimpanzees do not follow the gaze
direction of humans to outside targets; they do do this [7–8]. If that
target is food, then they may go and fetch it. However, in the so-
called object choice task in which the food is hidden, the situation
is different. Here the human points to one of several opaque
containers. In this situation the subject must not only locate the
target but also infer why the pointer is directing attention to the
container, which in itself is uninteresting. Human infants as young
as 14 months are successful in this task [9].
Perhaps surprisingly, domestic dogs are skilled in using a variety
of communicative cues, including pointing, in object choice tasks
[10]. Their performance cannot be explained by learning during
the experiment as in many studies they demonstrate such skill from
the very first trial. Also their performance cannot be explained by
major learning during ontogeny as puppies from an early age seem
to use human communication flexibly [11–13]. It is more likely
that dogs’ skills with human communication are an adaptation to
life with humans and are influenced by selection processes during
domestication. This is also supported by the fact that untrained
wolves perform poorly [12,13–14]. Even though wolves can learn
how to use pointing after receiving special training, e.g. clicker
training [15–16], dogs develop this skill earlier and need no
specific training in order to follow pointing [14].
There are several aspects of the object choice task, as it is
typically administered, that may make it more problematic for
chimpanzees than for dogs. The first is that typically for the chi-
mpanzees the containers and the food are on the human’s side of
some caging or barrier. This makes the task artificial in the sense
that the human does not really need the chimpanzee’s help in
locating the food – she could easily just lift the containers and look
herself. For the dogs the containers are not behind any barrier but
are freely accessible to them, which may make the setting more
natural and it may be easier for them to understand and attend
to the relevance of the communicative gesture. Furthermore, dogs
are mostly tested in a more distal set-up, where they have to move
towards one of the referents, while primates are mostly positioned
within reaching distance of the referents [17]. A second issue is that
chimpanzees might follow the pointing gesture to the container
and assume that the human intends to indicate the container
itself, not what might be inside. In this referential, communica-
tive setting the chimpanzees may simply follow gaze to an object,
whereas dogs may always expect to find something interesting
when following pointing.
Finally, the human’s pointing gesture in the object choice task is
informative pointing, in which the goal of the pointer is to help the
recipient altruistically by providing information useful to her –
specifically, the location of hidden food. Dogs’ domestication may
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may make no such assumption – leading to the possibility that
chimpanzees would be much more successful in a task in which the
human’s communicative motive was more directive or imperative.
In the current study, therefore, we presented both chimpanzees
and domestic dogs with a modified object choice task. In the task
the human pointed to one of two objects she desired, with both
potential referents visible, out of reach of the human, and located
some distance from the subject. In addition, the motive of the
pointing gesture was clearly directive (imperative), as the human
did not point to food for the subject’s benefit but to an object she
wanted the subject to bring to her.
Methods
We compared two groups of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) in their
ability to use an imperative pointing gesture to infer the target
object in a modified object choice task. In order to verify the
method and examine whether it generally worked we compared
the behaviour of the chimpanzees with that of a sample of
domestic dogs (Canis familiaris). In the current setting a human
communicator pointed to one of two objects with the respective
referents visible and in reach of the subjects. Objects were placed
behind subjects, out of their direct grasp. Handing over the re-
ferent to the communicator led to a direct reward for the subject.
Therefore, the communication was highly relevant for the subject
to help find the correct object. For practical reasons, the studies of
the chimpanzees and the dogs were conducted separately, with
four different experimenters (diploma student SK for the group of
chimpanzees housed in Leipzig Zoo, co-author JK or a keeper for
the group of chimpanzees on Ngamba Island, assistant KS for the
dogs) and in different physical settings. We used exactly the same
methods whenever possible.
This study adhered to the ‘‘Guidelines for the Use of Animals in
Research’’. IRB approval was not necessary for this kind of study
because no special permission for use of animals (chimpanzees and
dogs) in socio-cognitive studies is required in Germany. All
proccedures were performed in full accordance with German legal
regulations and the guidelines for the treatment of animals in
behavioural research and teaching of the Association for the Study
of Animal Behaviour (ASAB). For the chimpanzees on Ngamba
Island (Uganda) animal husbandry and research complied with
the‘‘PASA Primate Veterinary Healthcare Manual’’ and the ‘‘Chi-
mpanzee Sanctuary & Wildlife Conservation Trust Policy’’.
All dogs were registered in the dog database of the Department
of Developmental and Comparative Psychology (MPI EVA) and
recruited by phone. All dog owners with their dogs participated on
a voluntary basis.
Subjects
Chimpanzees. We pre-tested 23 chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes),
ofwhichthree hadtobe excludedfrom the studybecause duringthe
warm-up phase they did not fetch any objects in their area upon
request. Therefore the analysis includes data from 20 chimpanzees
(11 males, 9 females). Eleven individuals (four males, seven females,
age range: 4–32 years, five nursery-reared, six mother-reared) were
housed at the Wolfgang Ko ¨hler Primate Research Center at Leipzig
Zoo (Germany). The nursery-raised chimpanzees were reared from
a young age with peer conspecifics and a good deal of contact with
humans and their artefacts, but without human training aimed at
specific behavioural outcomes, that is, they were not trained to
perform certain ‘‘human-like’’ activities. Nine chimpanzees (seven
males, two females, age range: 7–24 years, all reared by humans
from a certain point in their lives but living in constant contact with
conspecifics) were from the Ngamba Island Sanctuary, Uganda. All
chimpanzees lived with conspecifics in social groups. Chimpanzees
were pre-selected based on their motivation to fetch objects, which
was information given by the keepers, who commonly incorporate
the fetching of objects from the cage into the animals’ routine (this
includes fetching only one or one out of several objects). The 11
chimpanzees from the Leipzig group were selected out of 14
chimpanzees, while the 9 chimpanzees from the Ngamba Island
group were selected out of 44 chimpanzees.
In Leipzig, the apes were housed in semi-natural indoor (overall
533 m2) and outdoor (4000 m2) enclosures with regular feedings,
enrichment and water ad lib. Subjects participated in the study
voluntarily and were deprived of neither food nor water. In
Ngamba, the apes were allowed to roam freely on the 40-ha island
during the day and spent the night in seven interconnected sleep-
ing rooms (overall 140 m2) with regular feedings and water ad lib.
Subjects participated in the study voluntarily and were deprived of
neither food nor water.
For the present study, subjects were tested individually. If mo-
thers had young infants, they were not separated. Subjects had
previously participated or were currently participating in other
studies.
Dogs. We tested 32 dogs (14 males, 18 females, age range: 1–
10 years). Like the chimpanzees, we aimed at pre-selecting dogs
based on their motivation to fetch objects. This was done by briefly
interviewing the dog owners over the phone, before the dogs were
invited to take part in the study. However, even though there was
an attempt to pre-select, thirty-four dogs did not pass the warm-up
phase, as they were not interested in retrieving stationary objects.
Seven dogs passed the warm-up phase but had to be excluded at
the very beginning of the experimental phase as they lost interest,
which means that, for instance, they could not be motivated
anymore to fetch any objects. Dog subjects were all family-owned
dogs of different breeds, recruited over a database at the Max
Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology (see Table S2 for
more information on sex, age and breed). Some of the dogs had
participated in other studies, though it was ensured that none of
the dogs had ever participated in a study which included fetching
objects upon receiving a communicative cue.
Set-up and Materials
Chimpanzees. Subjects were presented with pairs of everyday
objects commonly used by humans, which were similar in certain
features but never identical (see Figure 1). The chimpanzees in
Leipzig and the dogs were presented with four different pairs of
objects while the chimpanzees in Uganda were presented with eight
different pairs of objects. One reason for this difference for the
Ngamba Island chimpanzees was that they would develop string
preferences for objects quickly and we wanted to ensure that the
possibility that they develop a preference for one object over the
other was reduced to a minimum.
The general setting was identical for all subjects. Two objects
were presented such that they were within reach for the subject
but not for the human. The rooms differed in some respects for the
Leipzig and the Ngamba chimpanzees, which is why the setting
had to be adapted accordingly. The testing room in Leipzig com-
prised an ape and a human area, separated by transparent Ple-
xiglas or mesh panels. The pairs of objects were presented in a
rectangular Plexiglas container (147620630 cm) with two sepa-
rate chambers at the distal ends (distance: 1.10 m). It was mounted
in the back part of the apes’ area at a distance of 1.70 m from the
subject (see Figure 2). In the container’s resting position, the two
chambers were covered by a Plexiglas board. To gain access to one
of the chambers the board had to be pushed in one direction,
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and bast case (c) with Ngamba chimpanzees.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030913.g001
Figure 2. Experimental set-up for the Leipzig chimpanzees. (a) container, (b) objects, (c) testing window, (d) hydraulic door, and (e) camera.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030913.g002
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choice was unambiguous and no second choice was possible.
Subjects could pass the objects out through the hole (diameter:
6 cm) in the centre of a Plexiglas window, upon which they re-
ceived a reward.
On Ngamba Island subjects were tested in an empty room. The
two objects were presented on a board (with a distance of 1.50 m
between them) which was placed outside the testing room close to
the bars such that subjects could reach through the bars to get an
object. The experimenter was also located outside the testing room
but on the other side, i.e. opposite the side with the board. So after
taking an object subjects had to turn around to bring it to the
experimenter, to whom they could hand it through the metal bars.
To make sure that subjects could not reach for the second object
after making a choice, an assistant who stood behind the board
stepped forward and immediately pulled it away. The assistant was
always located between and equidistant to both objects. At no time
did the assistant gaze at or look in the direction of either of the
two objects. Instead the assistant gazed at the opposite side of the
setting, fixing upon an imaginary spot.
Dogs. The setting for the dogs was identical to the setting used
with the Ngamba chimpanzees. One major difference between dog
and ape settings is often that while there is a barrier between ape
and human, there is normally no such barrier in studies with dogs.
To see whether such a barrier between the human and the subject
would affect dogs’ behaviour, half of the dogs were tested with a
barrier between dog and human and the other half without this
barrier. The objects (see Figure 1) were presented on a board, which
was placed outside the testing arena behind a fence. The objects
were presented with a distance of 1.50 m between them. The
experimenter was located opposite the board. So after taking an
object subjects had to turn aroundto bringit to the experimenter, to
whom they could give it. Again, like with the chimpanzees, to make
sure that subjects could not reach for the second object after making
a choice, the assistant stepped forward and immediately pulled the
board away and behind a fence out of the subjects’ reach.
The pointing gesture, the accompanying gaze and the vocal
command were exactly the same for both groups of chimpanzees
and the dogs. The experimenter was positioned equidistant between
the two objects during each trial. All trials were videotaped.
Procedure
The study comprised two different phases: a warm-up phase
and an experimental phase. In the warm-up phase, which was
conducted to familiarize subjects with the general procedure, the
assistant placed only one object (which was later not used in the
test) in the container or on the board and subjects were repeatedly
encouraged by the experimenter to retrieve this object and to give
it to her. For the chimpanzee group in Leipzig, before each warm-
up trial the assistant placed the object in the container while the
subject was waiting in the adjacent room. Then the experimenter
entered and the subject was released into the testing compartment.
The assistant then centred the subject by offering fruit juice or
peanuts for the chimpanzees or a piece of dry dog food for the
dogs and as soon as the subject looked up from drinking/eating
and was paying attention to the experimenter, the experimenter
started requesting the object. For the Ngamba group and the dogs,
before each warm-up trial the assistant placed the object on the
board while the subject stayed with the experimenter, who
constantly offered food.
To request the object during the warm-up the experimenter
showed a reward (a grape or peanuts for the chimpanzees or a
piece of dry dog food for the dogs) to the subject and then in-
dicated that she wanted the object by beckoning (repeatedly
opening and closing her hand) and commanding ‘‘Give it to me!’’
with a stern tone of voice and a serious facial expression. No
directional cues such as gaze alternation or pointing were used.
We did not have to train chimpanzees to exchange objects for food
as they were used to exchanging things with the keepers, e.g. when
something had fallen into their cage.
When the subject handed over the object she received the reward
and the experimenter expressed her pleasure at receiving the object.
If the subject did not deliver the object for over 1 min the ex-
perimenter offered a second piece of reward. If the subject did not
react for another minute the experimenter acted frustrated, threw
the reward back into the bucket and left. The Leipzig chimpanzees
and the dogs received four warm-up trials, while the Ngamba
chimpanzees, who always went to get the object immediately upon
request, received only two warm-up trials. Subjects who exchanged
the object in three out of the four trials (or in both trials for the
Ngamba chimpanzees) were moved to the experimental phase. As
in Leipzig the warm-up also served to familiarize subjects with
the Plexiglas box, the location of the object was counterbalanced
between the left and right compartment, while for the Ngamba chi-
mpanzees and for the dogs the object was presented in the middle of
the platform.
After the warm-up phase, subjects entered the experimental
phase. Experimental trials were identical to the warm-up trials
with the exception that the assistant placed two objects into the
container/onto the board (always placing the left object first and
continuing with the right one), such that there was a distracting
object and a target object. The experimenter then indicated which
one she wanted by explicitly pointing to it. The gesture was ac-
companied by the same vocal cues as in the warm-up phase.
Pointing was conducted with the extended index finger of the
ipsilateral arm. The distance between the index finger and the
target object was approximately 2.40 m. The experimenter con-
tinued gesturing until the subject had decided on one of the two
objects. Every pointing gesture was accompanied by gaze al-
ternation (with raised eyebrows) between the subject and the
object. During each pointing gesture the experimenter gaze al-
ternated approximately three times before producing the gesture
again. If the subject took the target object this was regarded as a
choice and the experimenter started beckoning for it. If the subject
handed over the target object, she received the reward. Whenever
the subject chose the distractor or took the target object but did
not hand it over within 2 min (from the first pointing gesture)
the experimenter showed signs of frustration and discarded the
reward. If the subject could not have seen the pointing cue, e.g.
because she took an object before being focused (i.e. before drin-
king juice), the trial was repeated at the end of the session or at the
beginning of the next session, which then took place on a different
day. If the subject did not take an object within 2 min or showed
signs of distress, the session ended immediately and was repeated
on a different day.
Subjects received four sessions of four trials (chimpanzees in
Leipzig) or two sessions of eight trials (chimpanzees on Ngamba
and dogs), totalling 16 trials in each case. The break between se-
ssions was a minimum of one day and a maximum of six days.
Each pair of objects was used once or twice per session, with the
order of pairs randomly determined for each session. The location
of the target object was semi-randomized and counterbalanced
within each session with the stipulation that the target could not
be in the same location in more than two consecutive trials. Each
object of each pair was the target object in half of the trials. For the
chimpanzees in Leipzig the experimenter was a person who was
not completely new to the subjects but had no special relationship
with them. To see if relationship had an effect, we had two different
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session the experimenter was a stranger and in the other it was one
of the keepers with whom they were very familiar. Four subjects
started with the stranger as the experimenter, the other five started
with the keeper as the experimenter. Dogs were tested by a person
who was a complete stranger.
Data scoring and analysis
The subjects’ responses were coded live by the respective ex-
perimenter and completed from the videotapes. We scored whe-
ther the subject retrieved the target and also whether she gave this
to the experimenter. A second coder independently coded 100%
of the Leipzig chimpanzee data, 20% of the Ngamba chimpanzee
data and 20% of the dog data. These 20% were randomly chosen.
Interobserver reliability was perfect for both chimpanzee groups
(Cohen’s Kappa: k=1) and excellent for the dogs (Cohen’s Kappa
k=0.93). For statistical analysis we performed binomial tests,
separately for each subject. The expected proportion of correct
choices was 0.5. We then compared the number of correct choices
of the chimpanzees with that of the dogs using an independent-
samples t-test We also compared the dogs that were tested with a
barrier to the dogs that were not, using an independent-samples t-
test. We also compared each species separately against chance
performance, using one-sample t-tests. We further analyzed whe-
ther subjects learned over trials by using a repeated measures
ANOVA, comparing the first half of trials with the second half of
trials, with species as a between-subject factor. Finally we analyzed
the chimpanzees separately to see if the respective group (Leipzig
vs. Ngamba) had an effect, using an independent-sample t-test and
also compared the number of correct choices of chimpanzees in
the Ngamba group when tested with a stranger compared to when
tested with a familiar person, using a paired-sample t-test. All
statistical tests were two-tailed. Levene’s test of equality of var-
iances revealed that for all comparisons equal variance could
be assumed. We checked whether the assumptions for ANOVA
were fulfilled by visually inspecting plots of residuals versus ex-
pected values. This did not indicate any obvious violations of the
assumptions. The data were normally distributed according to a
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test.
Results
For the chimpanzee group, no subject chose the target object
significantly differently from chance level. This is despite the fact
that they were motivated to hand over the selected object, which
they did in 95.56% of the trials. For the dog group, 9 of the 32
subjects chose the target referent at above-chance levels (see Table
S1 and S2 for individual data).
A comparison with chance for each species separately showed
that the chimpanzees did not choose the target significantly
differently from chance levels (M=8.15, SD=1.79, t(19)=0.38,
p=0.711), while the dogs chose the target above chance levels
(M=11.16, SD=2.65, t(31)=6.73, p,0.0001). We then further
checked whether the barrier between the human and the dog
affected dogs’ behaviour, which it did because without a barrier
dogs were significantly more successful (without barrier: M=
12.18, SD=1.94, with barrier: M=10.13, SD=2.92, t(30)=
2.354, p=0.025). Even though the group with a barrier performed
above chance on its own (t(15)=2.913, p=0.011), we only com-
pared the group of dogs which had a barrier between them and
the human to the chimpanzees. This comparison showed that dogs
chose the target significantly more often than the chimpanzees
(t(34)=2.38, p=0.026) (Figure 3).
To see if any learning took place we compared the first half
of trials with the last half of trials using a 2-way ANOVA. The
main factor of order had no effect (F(1,50)=1.033, p=0.31), and
there was no interaction with species (F(1,50)=2.41, p=0.127).
However, as there was a trend for the interaction we compared the
first half of trials with the second half of trials for each species
separately. There was no effect for the chimpanzees (t(19)=1.37,
p=0.186) or the dogs (t(31)=0.502, p=0.62). To exclude the
possibility that results were influenced by the fact that subjects lost
interest during the trials and sessions, first trial data were analyzed.
First trial data showed that only 9 out of 20 chimpanzees chose
the target object in the first trial (binomial test p=0.82) but 24
out of 32 dogs chose the target object in the first trial (binomial
p=0.007). A comparison of chimpanzees and the dog group tested
with a barrier showed that in their first trial there was a significant
difference between both species (Fisher’s exact test: p=0.04). To
Figure 3. Decision behaviour. Mean number of trials in which subjects from the different species retrieved the correct object (+STD). Asterisks
indicate results different from chance (p,0.05).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030913.g003
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(data was separated into 4 sessions with 4 trials each) we conducted
an ANOVA with species as the between-subjects factor and session
as the within-subjects factor. Session had no main effect (F(3,150)
=0.493, p=0.68) and there was also no interaction with species
(F(3,150)=2.031, p=0.11). Finally, we looked at the chimpan-
zee data separately. A comparison of both groups (Leipzig vs.
Ngamba) revealed that there was no effect of group (Leipzig: M=
8.36, SD=1.29, Ngamba Island: M=7.89, SD=2.32, t(18)=
0.58, p=0.57). We also analyzed the data from the chimpanzees
on Ngamba Island separately to see whether relationship with
the<ven though the general context was much more natural than
in previous studies, chimpanzees still failed the task. This means
that their difficulties in previous object choice tasks cannot be due
to ambivalent reference (e.g. the cup instead of the reward in the
cup) as in the current study no inference about absent objects was
required. In addition, the current setting provides a more natural
communicative circumstance – the human needed the chimpan-
zee to fetch something inside her cage and she communicated
imperatively. Furthermore, the attention of the subjects was fo-
cused as much as possible on the pointing gesture, as the referents
were not located on the same visual plane as the cue and there
was some cost of moving toward the distal referents. Note that
chimpanzees understood the general idea of the procedure as they
did hand over one of the two objects but the communicative
gesture did not help them to make a correct choice. In addition,
chimpanzees’ failure to interpret the referential aspect of the po-
inting gesture seems to be independent of the relationship to the
experimenter and also independent of their rearing history. How-
ever, it could be that even though the human communicated
imperatively, the chimpanzees struggled with the still generally
cooperative nature of the task. There is evidence that chimpanzees
may perform better if the communicative gesture is presented in a
more competitive context [19] or it is used to indicate which cup
not to choose [20]. This may be because in competitive contexts,
signals coming from the human suddenly become more relevant
[21].
This current finding would seem to be discrepant with chi-
mpanzees’ documented skills of gaze-following to outside targets.
However, gaze-following can be seen as a kind of exploitative
behaviour in which one individual simply uses the gaze direction of
another – even if that other is unaware – to search for interesting
things. In the object choice task, the experimenter clearly intends
things toward the chimpanzee recipient, and they presumably know
this at some level. In addition, the chimpanzees have a current goal
of getting the food. In this situation, chimpanzees do not use a
pointing gesture, accompanied by gaze, to a specific target – even
though in the current studies they only had to follow the point to a
visible object. Somehow, the communicative context and their own
current goals made this into a too difficult-to-comprehend situation
for the chimpanzees, that is, more than a simple gaze-following
situation.
Most fundamentally, these results suggest that understand-
ing intentions is one thing, but understanding communicative
intentions is another. In particular, in Tomasello’s (2008) analysis,
comprehending an act of referential communication involves
understanding two levels of intentions [22]. First, the compre-
hender must understand that the experimenter intends for her to
attend to a particular referent. Then, the comprehender must try
to figure out why the experimenter wants her to attend to that
referent – is it to inform her of something helpfully? Or perhaps
the experimenter wants something for herself. Chimpanzees’
general failures in the object choice task suggest that they do not
process these two levels of referential communication readily.
Their failures in the task presented here in particular suggest that
in this situation, where the processing of two levels is important,
they even fail to comprehend the referential intention itself – or
else they do comprehend it, but they do not think it important for
their current goal of getting the food.
The results presented here are in contrast to very recent findings
by Mulcahy and Call (2009), who found that chimpanzees did
better in an object choice task if the choices were far apart. The
authors argue that the cost of moving in the more distal task puts
pressure on the subject to attend to the cue. This suggestion would
be difficult to reconcile with our findings as here the subjects also
have to move in order to fetch one object. More likely, we believe,
is that Mulcahy and Call’s set-up rendered the referential aspect of
the gesture as well as its specificity unnecessary. While attending to
one cup, the other was no longer in view, which made deciphering
the reference unnecessary. All the subject had to do was move to
the left or right cage (a procedure probably enhanced by the daily
routine of zoo-keeping) and then the subject found a cup. In the
current study, both objects were in the subject’s view as soon as she
turned around to get one of the objects.
In any case, the current results help us to specify in much more
detail which aspects of communication in the object choice task
are difficult for chimpanzees. Given that they are presumably one
of the animal species that is cognitively most similar to humans –
and humans comprehend communicative intentions in the object
choice task from as early as 14 months of age, i.e. prelinguistically
[9] – it is important to identify their difficulties in detail. It also
raises the question of why species which do not struggle with this
task, for example domestic dogs, are so skilful. Dogs’ readiness to
use human communicative cues seems to be a special adaptation
to life with humans and the result of certain selection pressures
during domestication [11,13–14,23]. Dogs’ special receptiveness to
human cooperative communication makes them the perfect social
tool for certain activities like herding, hunting etc. [24]. Which
mechanism best explains dogs’ use of human communication is
still an open question. One hypothesis is that dogs see human
communication as imperatives and spatial directives, ordering to
them what to do and where to go next [24–26].
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